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NAVAL LAW REVIEW
WOMEN IN COMBAT: CHANGING THE RIES
Professor Michael F. Noone, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970's, a number of offices in the Air Force displayed a
plaque which read: "Our job is to fly and fight-and don't you forget it."
The original was in the Air Force Chief of Staff's office in the Pentagon and
was intended to remind the reader of the ultimate purpose of the military.
If fighting is the mission of the armed forces, proponents of legal changes
which would permit women to serve in combat must argue that women can
fight as well as men and should be permitted to do so. That view is
represented by Mady Wechsler Segal.' Opponents of change represented by
Brian Mitchell 2 argue that women's fighting abilities are unknown at best
and, at worst, their presence in combat would adversely affect unit effi-
ciency. Representative Patricia Schroeder has introduced legislation which
would require the Army to open certain combat units to qualified women
volunteers and to carry out a four-year test intended to resolve the debate.
Representative Beverly B. Byron, chair of the House subcommittee review-
ing the bill, has already announced her opposition. Most observers doubt
that the legislation will pass; therefore, the questions posed by the title of
this article remain unanswered.
This article offers an approach, not an answer. It concludes that any
of the three branches of government could permit women to serve in
combat units. Women have been formally barred from serving in combat
ships or aircraft by a 1948 law-the Women's Armed Services Integration
Act. Because the sponsors of that legislation concluded that it was impos-
sible to distinguish combat and noncombat roles in the Army, the Secretary
* Professor Noone joined the Catholic University of America's Law School
faculty in 1978 after serving twenty years as an Air Force Judge Advocate. He
retired as a colonel and was Chief of theAirForce's Congressional Legislation
Division when women were first admitted to the service academies. He is a
graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (B.S. 1955),
Law School (LL.B. 1957; LL.M. 1962) of George Washington University's Law
Center (SJ.D. 1965) and is a Distinguished Graduate of the Air Force
Command and Staff College (1967). A Fellow of the Inter- University Senzinar
on Armed Forces and Society, he will be the Distinguished Visiting hofessor
of Law at the U.S. MilitaryAcadenmy in the Spring of 1991.
1. See ag., The Argument for Female Combatants, in Female Soldiers-Combatants or
Noncombatants 267-90 (Goldman ed. 1982); Women's Roles in the US. Armed Forces:
An Evaluation of Evidence and Arguments for Policy Decisions, in Conscripts and
Volunteers: Military Requirements, Social Justice, and the All Volunteer Force 200-14
(R.K. Fullinwider ed. 1983).
2. Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military (1989).
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of that service was given discretion to designate combat units which would
be filled only by men. Congress could change the law. The judiciary could
decide that the law, or the Army's exercise of discretion, was unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory. The President could issue an executive order
ameliorating the law's application. The nature of the inquiry into whether
there should be a change, and the criteria applied, will differ depending on
the branch of government involved. While that proposition is unremarkable,
the distinction seems to have escaped the attention of most proponents and
opponents of the combat exclusion laws.3 Although the considerations that
should apply can only be outlined, the debate is more complex than is
commonly suggested.
II. SHOULD CONGRESS CHANGE TIE COMBAT EXCLUSION
LEGISLATION?
The Women's Armed Services Integration Act, in which the combat
exclusions first appeared, was the product of a political compromise to
overcome the objections of some members of the Navy and their allies on
Capitol Hill while meeting the Army's desperate military manning needs as
the draft law expired.4 Women have been integrated in the armed forces for
over forty years, and the original participants to the compromise have left
the political scene. Although Representative Schroeder's public statements
do not indicate an awareness of the history of the legislation, her proposal
is obviously intended to develop empirical evidence which would serve as a
basis for further changing the 1948 law.3 Consequently, Congress must ask
whether integration of women into the combat units of the armed forces
would enhance or maintain combat efficiency.
To answer that question, Congress will have to focus on quality
rather than quantity. As the size of the U.S. forces declines as a result of the
reduction of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, demographic arguments
that the decreasing number of eligible males will require increased utiliza-
tion of women lose their effect.6 If foreseeable military manpower needs for
3. See, e.g., Lieberman, Woman in Combat, 37 Fed. Bar. N. & J. 215 (May 1990), where
the author's equal protection (i.e. judicial) analysis is weakened by references to
considerations (e.g., that female soldiers may be less likely to violate the laws of war)
which should have weight only in a legislative or executive context.
4. Women's Armed Services Integration Act, 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1948, 1956); Sherman,
'They either need women or they do not': Mairgaret Chase Smith and the Fight for Regular
Status for Women in the Miitayy, 54 The J. of Mil. Hist. 47 at 70-71 (1990). Surprisingly,
the topic is not discussed in the comprehensive study of the modem Navy's relations
with Congress. Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (1967).
5. The law was substantially changed in 1967 to permit women to hold permanent grades
through 0-6 (colonel/captain), to be appointed to general/flag officer grade, to
equalize retirement provisions, and to eliminate a two percent limitation on enlisted
strength. The changes have been attributed to "changing social mores and military
expediency." M. Binkin & S. Bach, Women and the Military 12 (1977).
6. In the 1980's, projections indicated that the services would, before the end of the
century, exhaust the pool of eligibles with a propensity to enlist (assuming that
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combat-qualified individuals can be met without expanding the pool of
eligibles, congressional attention must be on the quality of the eligibles. In
that regard, "quality" will have to be defined more carefully than has been
the case in the past. Formal definitions of quality have relied on Armed
Forces Qualification Test Scores, 7 and women recruits have consistently
scored higher than men.
No objective criteria have been developed, however, to determine
whether women could perform satisfactorily in combat units. At this point,
differences between the services arise. The Navy implements the statutory
bar primarily by designating certain vessels and types of aircraft as closed to
women and also proscribes women's assignment to certain occupational
specialties. The Air Force also relies primarily on weapons system designa-
tion, while the Army and Marine Corps bar women from combat by closing
occupational specialties. Since the Air Force and the Navy also rely on
occupational codes to bar women from vessels and aircraft (e.g., no woman
can be classified as a fighter pilot), the formulation of these codes is crucial
to the debate over any changes to present assignment policies. At the
enlisted end of the spectrum, recruits and noncommissioned officers are
now assigned to combat units if they have satisfied the requisite skill and
occupational code requirements. Officer assignments to units or particular
jobs predesignated as involving the risk of direct combat are similarly based
on the officer's grade, occupational code, and skill. Present and potential
combat leadership characteristics also play a role in the selection of officers
and senior noncommissioned officers for assignment to combat units.
Thus, because of the gender bar, assignments to combat units have
been based primarily on skill qualifications.8 Supporters of the combat bar
are either compelled to admit that present occupational specialty criteria,
while adequate to identify qualified males, are intrinsically gender-biased
and could not be used to identify qualified females, or to argue that, while
the assignment criteria are satisfactory, the additional costs associated with
the assignment of women do not warrant their inclusion in combat units,
ships, or aircraft. By contrast, proponents for change must either assume
that present assignment criteria are not gender biased (i.e., that they work
equally well for both sexes), or that it would be easy to make them
numbers, gender, and test scores remained constant). See generally Home, Modeling
Army Enlistment Supply for the All-Volunteer Force, Monthly Lab. Rev. 35 (Aug. 1985).
Thus, General Jeanne Holm could appropriately write in 1982 that "the ability of the
President to keep his commitment to build the nation's defenses without conscription
may very well turn on the question of women." Women and the Military 392 (1982).
7. See Rimland & Larson, The Manpower Qualiy Decline, An Ecological Perspective, 8
Armed Forces & Soc. 21, 67 n.8 (1981).
8. In this regard, the Army's efforts to develop and apply a direct combat probability code
by military occupational specialty (MOS) caused it to conclude that 53 percent of all
enlisted positions had the highest (P-i) expectation of exposure to combat. Women
had either to be excluded from the combat-related MOS or to be given preferential
treatment in assignments within the MOS. The Army elected to exclude them. M.
Marsden, The Continuing Debate Women Soldiers in the U.S. Anny, 58 Life in the Rank
& File 73-74 (D. Segal & H. Sinaiko eds. 1986).
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gender-neutral, and that once qualified women were identified (by occupa-
tional code specialty and, in the case of officers, leadership potential), that
the benefits associated with assigning women would outweigh the costs.
Therefore, any congressional debate over the effect of change on the quality
of manning must address a series of discrete issues.
A. Are Occupational and Skill Level Criteria Used to Assign
Male Personnel to Combat Units Gender Neutral?
If assignment is based on objective test scores (as is the case for
recruits and lower-ranking NCO's), the question can be answered by
validating the test. While this would not be easy, because tests for advanced
skill levels assume both prior experience in the (combat-related) field and
certain physiological characteristics, it should be possible to achieve a
neutral test for skill and knowledge. However, there are two intangibles
which would be difficult to validate: combat leadership potential and the
capability of mixed-gender units to maintain efficiency during sustained
contact with hostile forces. The Department of Defense has never been
obliged to take an official position on either issue. Certainly, the Services'
views on both issues should be solicited. In this regard, consideration should
be given to the variety of combat roles assigned to each of the Services and
to the nature of the leadership expected to be exercised.9
B. Assuming That Selection Criteria for Assignment to a Combat
Unit Are, Or Could Be Made, Gender Neutral, How Should
the Costs and Benefits of Any Change From Present Policies
Be Measured?
Empirical studies have focused on combat readiness rather than
effectiveness (i.e. once a unit achieves an established level of manning and
equipment, it is assumed to be "combat ready"), but no serious efforts have
been made to test, within that category, which units are more (or less)
effective over time.10 If enhanced or equivalent combat effectiveness should
be the primary criterion for deciding whether women should be integrated
into currently segregated units, Congress must require the military to
establish an analytic technique for measuring combat effectiveness. This
may prove to be rather easy for the Air Force and the Navy which could, for
example, measure and compare the ability to acquire and destroy targets
while under stress. It may prove to be impossible for the Army and Marine
Corps which operate in a far less structured environment." Both the Army
and the Navy have conducted tests where women were assigned to combat
units. The outcomes seem to suggest that assignment of women to combat
9. Compare F. Margiotta's discussion of service differences in The Changing World of the
American Military 463-73 (1978) with J. Holme's Women and the Military, supra note
6, which assumes that the four services are homogeneous.
10. A good, if somewhat dated, criticism of the current analytic system can be found in L.
Sorley, Prevailing Criteria: A Critique, in Combat Effectiveness 59-66 (S. Sarkesian ed.
1980).




units would lower efficiency, but the tests' methodology and the conclusions
drawn from them have been criticized on analytic grounds.
12
Therefore, before there can be any valid tests of the consequences of
assigning women to direct combat units, the services will have to define
combat effectiveness in measurable terms and ensure that gender bias
(physiological or psychological) in occupational codes is either eliminated
or clearly justified. Congress could then determine the costs, if any, of
maintaining or enhancing combat effectiveness in integrated units, and the
debate could proceed along rational lines.
Of course, Congress has an alternative. It may simply assume that
the costs outweigh the benefits (as Representative Byron contends) or, in
the alternative, favor Representative Schroeder's view that costs would be
negligible in light of the goal to be achieved. Recent history suggests that
so-called "equity arguments" will not sway Congress to change the law. The
Carter Administration recommended that the combat exclusion rules be
eliminated but the testimony offered by administration witnesses was so
unpersuasive 3 that, when the Reagan Administration announced that it was
withdrawing the initiative, a Democratic Congress did not object. There-
fore, while Congress could change the law, history suggests that it will not do
so unless it is satisfied (as it was in 1948) that combat effectiveness would be
maintained, if not enhanced, within reasonable cost.
III. SHOULD TIlE JUDICIARY REJECT COMBAT EXCLUSION
LAWS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the laws. A state law which contains a classification based on
gender is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.14 To
withstand that scrutiny, gender classifications "must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives."' 5 This intermediate standard of scrutiny requires a
court to determine whether the purpose of the discriminatory scheme is:
12. J. McNally, Women in de United States Militay: A Contemporary Perspective, 37-41
(Naval War C. 1985) (unpublished).
13. See eg., the congressional testimony of Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Construction) cited in I. Tuten,
The Argument Against Female Combatants, Female Soldiers: Combatants or Noncom-
batants 260 (N. Goldman ed. 1982). Danzig admitted that "equitable treatment" was
the only reason he could offer for admitting women into combat units. The Carter
Administration's initiative, and the military's response, is summarized in Witherspoon,
Female Soldiers in Combat: A Policy Adrift, 6 Minerva 18-22 (May 1988). Female
officers suspect that promotion possibilities for'higher (i.e., general and flag) grade are
limited because they can not serve in, or command, war fighting units. Sherman, supra
note 4, at 50 n.9, p. 78, n.93. While that may well be the case, a statutory change in the
law intended to benefit a few senior officers could not be expected to garner
widespread congressional support.
14. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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permissible; important; and the least restrictive classification which would
serve that end without substantial loss to the government. While the Federal
Government is not bound by the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court has applied the same kind of equal protection analysis under the fifth
amendment which does apply.
Thus, a judicial test exists for determining whether the congressional
statutory scheme discriminating against women in combat is constitutional.
If women have a constitutional right not to be discriminated against by
Congress, the costs (with which Congress should be properly concerned)
should have no effect on the judiciary's analysis. Certainly, a number of
Supreme Court fourteenth amendment decisions hold that "old notions"
about the respective roles of the sexes cannot justify discriminatory
schemes. 16 At first blush, the initial Supreme Court decision to consider
discriminatory treatment of women in the armed forces, Frontiero v.
Richardson,17 seems to stand as precedent for an attack on the combat
exclusion statute. That analysis, however, should be rejected.
Frontiero involved a congressional classification scheme relating to
entitlements. Women in the armed forces had to establish the dependency
of their spouses to be eligible for an additional allowance, while spouses of
males were presumed to be dependent. The plurality decision rejected the
classification. Four Justices (Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall)
subjected the classification to strict scrutiny; three (Powell, Blackmun, and
Burger) concluded that the statute failed the traditional rational-basis test;
Justice Stewart held that the statute was void under traditional scrutiny; and
Justice Rehnquist dissented. Subsequent decisions' 8 involving civilian clas-
sifications elaborated and extended the analysis. In Schlesinger v. Ballard,
however, the Court rejected the argument of a male officer who, relying on
Frontiero, argued that a gender-based statutory classification scheme which
made it easier to release males from active duty was discriminatory.' 9
Similarly, an equal protection attack on a statute which required that only
males register for possible future conscription failed in Rosiker v.
Goldberg.
20
Frontiero never achieved the precedential value that supporters of
equal rights of females in the armed forces had hoped. There are two
reasons for its failure, reasons which justify the prediction that the Supreme
Court will not extend Frondero's ruling to other types of discriminatory
statutory schemes in the armed forces within the next decade.
The first is based on the membership of the Court. Frontiero can be
seen as the last gasp of the Warren majority. Five of the Frontiero Justices
16. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 40 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355
(1979); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
18. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) and those cited in supra note 16.
19. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
20. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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participated in O'Callahan v. Parkera1 which struck down provisions of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice permitting trial by courts-martial of
servicemen who committed nonservice-connected crimes off-post and off-
duty. O'Callahan could be described as the apogee of the Warren Court's
efforts to ensure that the military remained subject to civilian judicial
control. O'Callahan was reversed nineteen years later in Solorio v. United
States22 by a Court which retained only two Warren Court Justices
(Brennan and Marshall).
The second reason for doubting that Frontiero will be extended to
other classes of discrimination is based on the Rehnquist Court's return to
what might be described as the traditional judicial recognition of the
military as a separate community and a concomitant deference to Congress'
right "to legislate with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when
prescribing the rules by which [military society] shall be governed than when
it is prescribing rules for [civilian society]. ' 23 It was to this tradition that the
Court returned in the Rostker and Schlesinger decisions. This deference,
which extends to internal regulations of the armed services, was pushed to
the limit in Goldman v. Secretary of Defense24 in which the Court narrowly
sustained a regulation which prohibited members of the Air Force from
wearing symbols of their religious belief while in uniform.2 If the Supreme
Court defers to Congress on matters military, and Congress shows no
inclination to act, then the executive branch is the only recourse for
supporters of the concept of women in combat.
IV. SHOULD THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERMIT WOMEN TO
SERVE IN COMBAT?
While it is true that the statutes prohibit service in combat ships and
aircraft, the Navy and Air Force decide what ships and aircraft fall within
the proscription, and the Secretary of Defense decides what constitutes
combat. The Army could eliminate its regulatory restrictions without
concern for the statutes. But, would the executive do so, either by requesting
that the statutes be eliminated or by Executive order? There is an obvious
precedent.
On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981
which guaranteed "equality of treatment and opportunity to members of the
armed forces." The Executive order's language was consistent with the
21. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
22. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
23. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974). See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,
93-94 (1954); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746-48 (1975); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 4546 (1976); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353-58 (1980).
24. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
25. Congress responded to the decision by passing a law which permitted deviations from




"separate but equal doctrine" enunciated by the Plessy v. Ferguson Court's
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection provisions, 26
but it was applied so that institutional racial discrimination in the armed
forces was eliminated. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps had already
begun the process of integration before the Executive order was drafted.
27
While the parallel is not a perfect one-since Plessy permitted discrimina-
tion while the combat exclusion statutes require it-the Executive order
reminds us of the power of the President, particularly when acting as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to interpret restrictive laws.
There is another parallel as well. Women might not be able to meet
objective criteria for service in combat. Similar concerns had been ex-
pressed in the 1940's over the intellectual abilities of blacks serving or
seeking to serve in the armed forces. 28 The concern led to an imposition of
quotas to limit the number that could be enlisted.29 The Truman Admin-
istration acknowledged that the concerns might be valid (in light of the
substandard education received by many southern blacks), but concluded
that appropriate tests would keep out the unqualified.30 Presumably, a
similar testing process could keep- unqualified women out of combat
assignments.
Although there is precedent for Executive action, circumstances
have changed radically. In 1948, with the elimination of the draft, the
Department of Defense could not maintain force levels unless they either
lowered their entry requirements, raised the level of compensation, or
expanded the pool of applicants by admitting women and desegregating
military units. They chose the latter alternative. In 1990, there is no shortage
of qualified applicants to the combat arms and, therefore, there is no
military incentive to change present practices. Moreover, President Truman
had a political incentive to take the apparently radical step of desegregating
the armed forces. He was expected to lose his Presidential campaign against
Thomas Dewey unless he could rally the Democratic liberals who would
otherwise support the Progressive candidate, Henry A. Wallace. His
political advisor, Clark Clifford, suggested that racial desegregation of the
armed forces would establish the President's liberal credentials and dis-
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. See M. Blinkin et al., Blacks and the Military 27 (1982). The best history of Exec. Order
No. 9981 is found in M. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, at
309-14 (1981).
28. W. Young, Minorities in the Military 210-12 (1982), discusses the use of Army
intelligence Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores to justify racial discrim-
ination.
29. S. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier 524 (1949); R. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the
U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-53, 202-3, 207, 215 (1969).
30. See memorandum to the President from David K. Niles, February 7, 1950, in M.
MacGregor & B. Nalty, Blacks in the Military, Essential Documents 263 (1981).
31. B. Nalty, Strength for the Fight 241-42 (1986); M. MacGregor, Integration of the
Armed Forces 309-11 (1982).
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courage defections?' The Executive order was issued three months before
the election and, contrary to predictions, the President won. The political
scene today offers no parallel.
V. CONCLUSION
There are three possible conditions that would cause the combat
exclusion laws to be changed. The least probable of these is that the
Supreme Court will change its views regarding the permissible ways that
Congress and the Executive may regulate the internal affairs of the armed
forces. Nor does it seem probable that enlistment rates will decline so
precipitously that the Executive and Congress will be compelled, as they
were in 1948, to change military manpower policies in order to meet
enlistment goals. Finally, while domestic political considerations could serve
as an engine for change, the absence of valid test data and structural
differences between the services suggest that any proposal to eliminate the
combat exclusion bar will face formidable obstacles.
This analysis serves to emphasize two facts which much of the policy
debate has obscured: The national security establishment have been prop-
erly cautious about undertaking changes which could affect the combat
readiness of the armed forces, no matter how salutary the social goal; and,
as the size of the force declines, combat efficiency rather than combat
readiness may well become the criterion for evaluating change. The debate
will continue-but over means, not ends.
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